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Book Review
Jeff Benedict’s Little Pink House:
The Back Story of the Kelo Case
GEORGE LEFCOE
Little Pink House is a fast paced account by Jeff Benedict of the events surrounding
the 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London. At the core of the
tale is how Kelo and a handful of her neighbors challenged the New London Development
Corporation’s (“NLDC”) use of eminent domain for the economic redevelopment of the
Fort Trumbull neighborhood. A libertarian-inspired public interest law firm named the
Institute for Justice (“IJ”) agreed to represent the beleaguered property owners. IJ
challenged the notion that economic development could be regarded as a public use. IJ
also unfurled an effective national public relations campaign against what it dubs eminent
domain abuse. Benedict gives us front row seats to see how the media drama unfolded.
Though IJ triumphed in the court of public opinion, it lost the Kelo case in the
Connecticut and U.S. Supreme Courts. A majority of judges in both courts flatly rejected
IJ’s contention that takings for economic development were not for a public use.
This Book Review spotlights four important aspects of the Kelo back story that have
been largely overlooked. First, IJ’s masterful media campaign accentuated NLDC’s
shortcomings while dismissing its sizable accomplishments in the rehabilitation of Fort
Trumbull. Second, most of the disputed properties were being acquired to widen roads, a
prototypical public use. This Book Review explains why New London’s counsel chose not
to rely on this fact in making its case before the U.S. Supreme Court. Third, the trial court
had ruled in favor of Kelo and some of the other plaintiffs in their eminent domain
challenge. Kelo was forced out after IJ decided to appeal this decision and lost on appeal.
The appeal enabled IJ to keep the Kelo dispute in the public eye, a good thing for a public
interest law firm like IJ that needs to raise funds for its cause. But the appeal resulted in a
reversal of the trial court’s opinion that would have allowed Kelo to keep her house.
Readers can assess for themselves whether the decision to appeal was taken in a
professionally responsible way. Fourth, Kelo and the other plaintiffs ended up negotiating
hefty settlements with the Governor of Connecticut that were two to three times fair market
value, the basis on which most of the other property owners in Fort Trumbull were
compensated. This Book Review details the extent of over compensation, and how it came
about. The author obtained much of the information in this paper through interviews and
correspondence with New London officials and attorneys over a period of several years.
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Jeff Benedict’s Little Pink House:
The Back Story of the Kelo Case
GEORGE LEFCOE*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE BASIC STORY LINE
Little Pink House is an engrossing account by nonfiction writer Jeff
Benedict of the events surrounding the 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Kelo v. City of New London. Jeff Benedict sets out to tell “the stirring
story behind what drove Susette Kelo—a divorced nurse—to take on a
powerful governor, a billion-dollar corporation, and a hard-charging
development agency to save her pink cottage . . . [I]t is a hidden drama that
begs to be exposed.”1 Though Jeff Benedict has a law degree, he is not a
practicing lawyer and touches only lightly on the legal and policy issues of
the Kelo case. Instead, he offers a gripping account of the behind-thescenes maneuvering in the case from start to finish.
This Book Review traces Benedict’s account. He briskly depicts
Susette Kelo’s determined resistance to being displaced and recounts the
efforts of New London’s civic leadership to lift one of the city’s most
distressed neighborhoods out of the economic doldrums. Benedict’s
sympathies reside entirely with Kelo against New London’s political
establishment. He lauds the efforts of Kelo’s attorneys to save her home
from eminent domain and endorses the opinion of dissenting Supreme
Court Justice O’Connor,2 while barely mentioning the majority holding of
the U.S. Supreme Court and its bearing on New London’s aspirations.
At the core of the tale is how a libertarian-inspired public interest law
firm named the Institute for Justice (“IJ”) agreed to represent a small band
of beleaguered property owners, challenged the New London Development
Corporation’s (“NLDC”) use of eminent domain for the economic
redevelopment of the Fort Trumbull neighborhood, and overwhelmed
NLDC with a blistering public relations campaign. IJ’s media message
portrays heartless government bureaucrats flouting the Constitution’s
“public use” requirement by condemning private homes and small
*
Ervin and Florine Yoder Chair of Real Estate Law, Gould School of Law, University of
Southern California, Los Angeles, CA. The author gratefully acknowledges the thoughtful research of
Kevin Kelly, USC Law 2010, deft editing by Bill Givens and Katherine Guevarra, insightful
observations by Edward O’Connell, John Brooks, and Tom Londregan of how New London city
officials saw the case and its outcomes, and masterful lawyering by Dana Berliner and Scott Bullock,
whose work set off an avalanche of Kelo scholarship for which we participants owe them an especially
hearty thanks.
1
JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE ix (2009).
2
See id. at ix–x.
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businesses for the benefit of greedy private developers and big
corporations.3
IJ chose Kelo as its lead plaintiff. Instead of listing alphabetically all
the parties it represents in a particular lawsuit, as do most litigators, IJ
carefully selects the first party to be named in each of its cases with an eye
to the lead plaintiff becoming a spokesperson for the case and the property
rights cause.4 Kelo proved to be an excellent choice, a strong-willed
homeowner who became a convincing national advocate for property
rights.
II. KELO ACQUIRES HER LITTLE PINK HOUSE
Benedict promises to tell us what drove Kelo to take on city hall. He
starts by depicting her acquisition of the Little Pink House. Before she
acquired it, she had tried to convince her then-husband to sell their ranch
style home in rural Preston, Connecticut. She sought to tempt him with a
property she happened to spot one day, a house with a private dock and a
small patch of beach in a waterfront community on the Long Island
Sound.5 He would not budge. The Preston house was fifteen minutes from
where he worked and the beach house was an hour away from his work.
“‘I’m going to ask you for the last time,’ she said in desperation. ‘I’m not
leaving Preston,’ he said.”6
She finally settled on what became the Little Pink House—8 East
Street, New London—because of its partial waterfront view and
affordability.7 The house was set on a postage stamp lot little bigger than
the house itself.8 It had two bedrooms upstairs and a bathroom on each
floor.9
In the 1980s, Avner Gregory, an ardent preservationist, had
refurbished the century-old home and sold it to an investor.10
Unfortunately, the investor let the house deteriorate, unoccupied. By the
time Kelo spotted a broker’s “For Sale” sign on the place, the house had
lingered on the market for years. The yard was so overgrown with brush
and weeds, Kelo had to cut back the overgrowth just to reach the front
door.11
Kelo was not shy when it came to negotiating the purchase price. The
3
See id. at 292 (describing a research paper sponsored by IJ entitled “Public Power, Private Gain”
that was given to the television program, 60 Minutes, to highlight nationwide takings for the benefit of
private use).
4
Id. at 200.
5
Id. at 4–5.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 8.
8
Id. at 14–15.
9
Id. at 12.
10
Id. at 15.
11
Id. at 13.
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property had been listed at $59,000. Her opening bid was $42,000—
$17,000 below list. The owner countered at $56,000. Kelo had been preapproved for a first-time home buyer’s loan for up to $53,500—and
$56,000 is the price she agreed to pay—provided the seller reimbursed her
for a paint job and closing costs. Kelo managed to borrow her down
payment of $2500 from a friend.12
Kelo cleaned up the overgrown yard, painted the house “Odessa Rose”
(a pinkish, salmon color), replaced the curtains and window shades, puttied
all the nail holes, stripped and refinished the hardwood floors, painted the
molding, and stained the stairs.13
III. FORT TRUMBULL BEFORE
Benedict carefully traces how Kelo’s house ended up in condemnation.
The saga began with a decision taken by the former Governor of
Connecticut, John G. Rowland, a Republican, to woo traditionally
Democratic voters by offering massive state funding to jump-start
economic development projects in working class towns suffering high
unemployment rates and declining property tax rolls.14
New London was one of those towns that needed a boost.15
Contributing to New London’s job losses, the Navy had a big payroll there
until Congress shuttered the local naval underwater research center in
1995. After that, “the [Fort Trumbull] neighborhood began to resemble a
ghost town.”16
As part of its politically wrenching, cost-cutting base closure moves,
Congress urged communities across the country to replace lost military
jobs by stimulating new economic redevelopment.17 Governor Rowland
and his advisors decided to do just that. To spearhead the revitalization
program, Governor Rowland resuscitated the long moribund quasi-public,
12

Id. at 12, 14, 16.
Id. at 26, 36, 41–42.
14
Id. at 9. By July 2004, months before the U.S. Supreme Court would agree to hear the Kelo
case, federal prosecutors indicted Governor Rowland on corruption charges for which he was sentenced
to a year and a day in prison. He resigned as governor just before the indictment and was promptly
replaced by the former Lieutenant Governor Jodi Rell. Id. at 299–300, 376.
15
The Environmental Impact Evaluation, completed in November 1998, reported higher
unemployment rates in New London than in neighboring towns or state-wide, a city economy
outperformed by the region and state, a sharply declining labor market, and an older housing stock
riddled with vacancies. Kelo v. New London (Kelo I), No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789,
*119–20 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002).
16
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 15–16.
17
Congress authorized the Department of Defense to close and realign bases. 10 U.S.C. § 2687
(2006). At the same time, the Department of Defense was authorized to encourage and assist localities
impacted by closures to seize the opportunity and replace lost jobs and local tax revenues through
vigorous economic redevelopment. See TADLOCK COWAN & BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
MILITARY BASE CLOSURE: SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS 5 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/natsec/RS22147.pdf.
13
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non-profit NLDC. He could have chosen to funnel state funds through
the city’s redevelopment agency but preferred to work with an entity not
beholden to New London’s Democratic Party leaders. As chair of NLDC’s
volunteer board, the Governor designated the nationally respected scholar
Claire Gaudiani. At the time, Gaudiani was President of the prestigious
Connecticut College.19 NLDC’s mission could be described as converting
a nineteenth century industrial wasteland into a place that would appeal to
firms employing “knowledge workers”: scientists and engineers, artists and
writers, and professionals and managers, an ensemble dubbed the
“[c]reative class[es]” of the twenty-first century.20
IV. SPINNING KELO AND FORT TRUMBULL:
BENEDICT AND IJ—CLOSE BUT NOT IDENTICAL
Though Benedict embraces IJ’s David-and-Goliath characterization of
the struggle between the Kelo case holdouts and NLDC, his depiction is
necessarily more nuanced than theirs. Benedict’s goal was to write a story
that might form the basis of a screenplay.21 Dahlia Lithwick, a New York
Times reviewer, put it this way: “The investigative reporter Jeff Benedict
has decided to cast Kelo in the style of Julia Roberts as Erin
Brockovich.”22 To be believable, movie characters need to be threedimensional.23 Their flaws can command the viewer’s attention and
empathy. In overcoming their flaws, well-drawn characters give a sense of
direction to the story.24 Actor Christian Bale makes an important point
when he explains that an audience does not have to approve of an author’s
characters but they have to relate to them.25 Dislikable characters can
enliven a script as long as they possess at least one redeeming
18
In Connecticut, state funds can be funneled to municipalities through one of two statutory
vehicles: (1) economic development (Municipal Development Project), Chapter 132, or (2)
redevelopment (Redevelopment and Urban Renewal), Chapter 130. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-190
(2008) (granting the commissioner authorization to make grants to facilitate development programs);
Id. § 8-195 (2008) (establishing special planning grants for municipal development projects); Id. § 8135 (2008) (authorizing municipalities to levy taxes, utilize grants, or other avenues to carry out a
redevelopment plan). Governor Rowland chose the former because once a city forms a non-profit
economic development corporation, its board is self-perpetuating. Practically, this meant that the
Governor would be able to designate the board of the New London Development Corporation, and not
the New London City Council. Had the governor proceeded under Chapter 132, the New London City
Council would have been entitled to designate the agency and name the individuals in charge of the
redevelopment effort.
19
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 18, 20.
20
See RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS 67–68 (2002).
21
See Stephen Chupaska, Journey of a Writer, MYSTIC TIMES, May 28, 2009, at 17 (“Benedict
admitted that the story behind Little Pink House would translate better as a film than a book.”).
22
Dahlia Lithwick, Driven Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at BR17.
23
See RAY FRENSHAM, TEACH YOURSELF SCREENWRITING 74 (2008).
24
See id. at 89 (“‘Take one aspect of your own [writer’s] character that you’re not particularly
proud of and explore that, push the envelope to the limit.’” (quoting author Kingsley Amis)).
25
Id. at 93.
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characteristic (remember Matt Damon as Mr. Ripley in The Talented Mr.
Ripley?).26
The challenge for public interest lawyers is to shake individuals “away
from their ordinary state of passivity and to act collectively.”27 Public
interest advocates need to “single out an existing social condition and
redefine as unjust what was previously viewed as unfortunate, yet
tolerable.”28 They need to engage in framing—naming the problem,
blaming someone for it, and claiming a solution for the perceived
grievance.29
Consistent with the technique of naming, blaming, and claiming, when
Chip Mellor founded IJ in 1991, “he developed a simple formula for
selecting cases: (1) sympathetic clients; (2) outrageous facts; and (3) evil
villains.”30 He avoids nuances or complexities that would distract from the
clarity of IJ’s vigorous media message—its dedication to protect property
owners from their property being taken to benefit other private owners.
Litigation public relations expert and practicing attorney, James
Haggerty, would endorse Chip Mellor’s approach. Haggerty advises
clients to: (1) “[s]hed the layers of complexity that often envelop your
particular legal issue”; (2) “[r]efrain from qualifying, differentiating, or
otherwise anticipating and refuting opposing arguments”; and (3) “[l]ead
with your conclusion, not with your factual argument.”31
The differences between what it takes to write a good screenplay and
how public interest lawyers need to depict events becomes clear when one
compares the disparate ways Benedict and IJ characterized the Fort
Trumbull area before and after NLDC’s intervention. To IJ’s attorney
Scott Bullock, who “had grown up in the economically devastated
Pittsburgh of the seventies and eighties, the Fort Trumbull neighborhood
didn’t look depressed to him.”32 An IJ summary asserts, “The richness and
vibrancy of this neighborhood reflects the American ideal of community
and the dream of homeownership.”33
By contrast, Benedict describes the neighborhood’s “tough
appearance” as “[a] hodgepodge of industrial properties, warehouses, and
old, small homes, the Fort Trumbull neighborhood was cut off from the
26

Id. at 91.
Lynn Jones, The Haves Come Out Ahead: How Cause Lawyers Frame the Legal System for
Movements, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 182, 184 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A.
Scheingold eds., 2006).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 185.
30
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 199.
31
JAMES HAGGERTY, IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION 78 (2003).
32
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 167.
33
Institute for Justice, Kelo v. New London, Lawsuit Challenging Eminent Domain Abuse in
New London, Connecticut, http://www.ij.org/ (follow “Case Information” hyperlink; then follow
“Private Property Rights” hyperlink; then follow “New London, Connecticut” hyperlink) (last visited
Jan. 26, 2010).
27
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rest of New London, sandwiched between Amtrak rail lines on the west
and the abandoned naval base on the north.”34 Fort Trumbull was only a
block from a smelly sewage treatment plant “which essentially consisted of
some oversized cesspools,”35 in one of New London’s scruffier locales,
zoned industrial since 1928.36
To the NLDC staff, Fort Trumbull had always been on the wrong side
of the tracks, contained relatively few homes and businesses, and had
many unpleasant uses that needed to be cleaned up. NLDC officials
adamantly disputed intimations by the opposition that Kelo and her
neighbors were going to be displaced to make way for high-end condos.
“[T]he Municipal Development Plan never intended for the Kelo block to
be reused for housing, in part because it was just across the street from the
sewage treatment plant.”37
In 1998, a nationally renowned engineering firm worked on both the
Environmental Impact Evaluation and NLDC’s re-use plan for the area. It
found that many properties suffered from deferred maintenance, and that
[l]ess than 12% of residential buildings in the MDP area . . .
are considered in average or better condition. . . . [Thirty
percent] are in poor condition. . . . As of February 19, 1999,
67 of the 115 dwelling units in the MDP (municipal
development plan) area were occupied. Of these, only 15
were owner-occupied, with the remaining 52 renter-occupied.
[Regarding the availability of replacement properties, a]
review of published real estate listings in New London
showed 19 homes for sale under $70,000, and 23 homes for
sale between $70,000 and $90,000.38
34

BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 15.
Id. at 33.
36
Interview with Tom Londregan, New London City Attorney (June 1, 2009). Early zoning laws
established a pyramid of uses rooted in nineteenth century notions of nuisance law. RICHARD F.
BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME, MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES 4 (1966). Homes were protected
by “residential” zoning. Houses could be built in commercial zones (e.g., retail), the center of the
hypothetical zoning pyramid. The least protected areas were zoned industrial. There, property owners
could build virtually anything. See id. at 127. Poorly paid workers inhabited houses and trailers
located in industrial zones from which they could walk to work if they were fortunate enough to find a
job in the area. See id. at 127–28. Early zoning’s reliance on cumulative zoning resulted in industrial
zones becoming a community “garbage pail” for all the uses that could not qualify for placement in
“higher” zones, including residential uses such as trailer parks. Id. Later, many localities revised their
ordinances by establishing purely industrial zones once they discovered that housing and commercial
uses made an area unattractive to operators of prime industrial facilities. “Generally, noncumulative
zoning ordinances have replaced cumulative zoning ordinances, reflecting changed beliefs about
compatibility.” STUART MECK & KENNETH PEARLMAN, OH. PLAN. & ZONING L. § 8:39 (14th ed.
2009). New London never did this in the Fort Trumbull area.
37
E-mail from John Brooks, Executive Dir., New London Dev. Corp., to George Lefcoe (July 21,
2009, 13:27 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brooks, July 21 E-mail].
38
NEW LONDON DEV. CORP., FORT TRUMBULL MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, at app. A, 8–9
(2000).
35
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V. FORT TRUMBULL AFTER NLDC
The individual who deserves credit for doing the most to turn around
the area was NLDC Board Chair Claire Gaudiani. While IJ’s Bullock
dismisses Claire Gaudiani as “almost a parody of a condescending,
collectivist academic,”39 Benedict depicts Gaudiani as a worthy screenplay
antagonist for Kelo. He describes Gaudiani as ambitious, focused and
intense,40 attractive, and sometimes seductive, with more than a touch of
arrogance.41 “One of [the] themes that emerges is the conflict between two
remarkably strong women, the glamorous, accomplished, imperious
Gaudiani and nurse/homeowner Susette Kelo, a divorced woman from a
hardscrabble background who had gone through much to buy her ‘little
pink house’ and would not leave it.”42
Perhaps the most significant difference between Benedict’s account
and the IJ’s is that Benedict acknowledges the importance of Pfizer’s
decision to build its impressive office and research facility in New London,
and the key role of Claire Gaudiani in negotiating the deal between
Governor Rowland and the pharmaceutical firm.43 A Hartford Courant
reviewer of Benedict’s book summarized Gaudiani’s accomplishment well:
“Getting Pfizer to commit to buil[d] a $300 million complex on a
brownfield next to a junkyard and a sewage treatment plant might have
qualified for the Nobel Prize in economic development, were there
one . . . .”44 As a result of this single transaction, Pfizer New London
would bring 2000 new jobs to more than offset the 1500 jobs that had been
lost to the naval base closure.45
As part of its agreement with Pfizer and NLDC, the State of
Connecticut agreed to pay for cleaning up the New London Mills property
that had piles of rubble atop land contaminated with all sorts of industrial
39
Scott Bullock, The Patriots of Fort Trumbull, LIBERTY & L., Dec. 2004, available at
http://www.ij.org/ (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “Liberty & Law” hyperlink; then
follow “December 2004” hyperlink; then follow “The Patriots of Fort Trumbull” hyperlink).
40
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 35.
41
Id. at 219.
42
Tom Condon, Kelo Case a Planning Failure, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 1, 2009, at C5.
43
See BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 50 (describing Gaudiani’s approach to Pfizer and the Rowland
administration).
44
Condon, supra note 42. Though Condon admires Gaudiani’s achievement in landing Pfizer, he
faults “Gaudiani, city officials and their state backers” for trying to “double down on the Pfizer
investment by clearing and developing the 90-acre peninsula that adjoins the facility” and not trying to
preserve the houses as part of a mixed-use project. Id. Instead, they went for a scorched earth policy,
“a throwback to 1950s–1970s urban renewal projects, almost all failures (including, Benedict might
have pointed out, a large project in downtown New London).” Id.
45
Tedd Mann, Pfizer’s Fingerprints on Fort Trumbull Plan, NEW LONDON DAY, Oct. 16, 2005,
available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/bloggers/1503363/posts; see also Kelo v. City of New
London (Kelo III), 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005) (“In 1996, the Federal Government closed the Naval
Undersea Warfare Center, which had been located in the Fort Trumbull area of the City and had
employed over 1,500 people.”).
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pollutants. This abandoned site is where Pfizer’s sparkling new research
and development laboratory would be built.47 Using NLDC as its conduit,
the Governor extended additional millions of dollars in state funds to cap
the cesspools at the sewage treatment plant so as to eliminate the sickening
odors, buy out the owner of the adjoining scrap metal yard, widen the
area’s narrow roads, install sidewalks, rejuvenate Fort Trumbull State Park,
and refurbish Fort Trumbull itself,48 a structure that had been allowed to
sink into great disrepair, becoming a “decaying fortress.”49
IJ realized that none of the condemnations were for Pfizer’s direct use.
But in order to conjure up an evil villain, it cast Pfizer as the great behindthe-scenes manipulator instead of as a concerned corporate citizen, eager to
secure the best possible environment for its employees. In this situation,
improving the urban environment in ways that would benefit Pfizer also
produced benefits for New London residents in general.50 Besides the
indirect benefits of jobs and an increased tax base, John Brooks and
William Busch list the public benefits:
The plan involved acquisition of significant fallow land
(including a closed railroad yard and former oil terminal),
removal of the obsolete buildings (especially on the closed
Navy base), remediation of the soil (costing more than $25
million), and installation of significant new public
infrastructure to the area ($15 million in new streets,
sidewalks and utilities). It also included public amenities,
such as the creation of a new state park around the historic
Fort Trumbull (state investment of more than $25 million),
and a new public access waterfront walkway to enhance the
redevelopment area.51
Residents and visitors can now enjoy the stunning waterfront from the
newly refurbished Fort Trumbull and Fort Trumbull State Park.
These public benefits are of great legal significance. An economic
development project qualifies as a public use even if it benefits private
firms or individuals as long as the main beneficiaries are the general

46

See BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 23, 52–53.
Id. at 56.
48
Conn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Fort Trumbull State Park, http://www.ct.gov/dep/cwp/view.asp?A=
2716&Q=325200 (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
49
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 14, 53.
50
See Kelo v. New London (Kelo II), 843 A.2d 500, 538 (Conn. 2004) (“[A]lthough a great deal
of consideration was given to the various demands and needs created by the new Pfizer facility, this
consideration was given for the purpose of making the development plan more beneficial to the city.”).
51
John Brooks & William Busch, Perception v. Reality, A Commentary on Media Bias and
Eminent Domain, RIGHT OF WAY, May/June 2008, at 20, available at https://www.irwaonline.org/
EWEB/upload/0508a.pdf.
47
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52

public, and in the Fort Trumbull project, the U.S. Supreme Court
identified public benefits galore.53
Exhibit 1

Exhibit 1 depicts the disputed parcels at the time of the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Kelo. The Pfizer buildings are at the bottom of the
52
See Kelo II, 843 A.2d at 541 (“Thus, we conclude that an exercise of the eminent domain power
would be an unreasonable violation of the public use clause if the facts and circumstances of the
particular case reveal that the taking was primarily intended to benefit a private party, rather than
primarily to benefit the public.”); see also Katz v. Brandon, 245 A.2d 579, 586–87 (Conn. 1968)
(“There is nothing in the record to indicate that any conveyance of land has been made to [a
manufacturing corporation] or that any agreement or understanding exists which would provide it with
any advantage which is not available to others who may be interested as redevelopers.”); Bugryn v.
Bristol, 774 A.2d 1042, 1047 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (“Even if the taking [for an industrial park, an
undisputed public use] would later provide a site for [a major local company], a consequence that
would be neither undesirable to the defendants nor adverse to the goals that the park plan seeks to
achieve, that fact would not support the plaintiffs’ claim [of a private taking] in light of the ample
evidence in the record concerning the plan as a whole.”).
53
As the Court in Kelo stated:
The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it believes
will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including—but by no means
limited to—new jobs and increased tax revenue. As with other exercises in urban
planning and development, the City is endeavoring to coordinate a variety of
commercial, residential, and recreational uses of land, with the hope that they will
form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. To effectuate this plan, the City has
invoked a state statute that specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to
promote economic development. Given the comprehensive character of the plan,
the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our
review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in Berman, to resolve the challenges of the
individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan.
Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged
here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
Kelo III, 545 U.S. 469, 483–84 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
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picture—six white office structures. In the center right hand portion of the
photo is Fort Trumbull and Fort Trumbull State Park. Notice the new
waterfront walk. Just to the left of the Fort Trumbull parking lot is Parcel
4A (the block containing the properties of Susette Kelo, Billy Von Winkle
and Matthew Dery), wedged between the Fort and the sewage treatment
plant. Parcel 3 (Beyer Pattaya Construction, Cristofaro, and AthenianBrelevsky) lies above the center of the plant on the other side of the road—
the parcel with small buildings barely visible on it.
Exhibit 2

Exhibit 2 shows the site as it looked in October 2008. Most of the
structures have been removed from Parcels 3 and 4A. The stand-alone
building in the center of the photo is 1 Chelsea Street, formerly part of the
U.S. Naval Undersea Warfare Center.
Boston-based redevelopers,
Corcoran Jennison, spent $24,000,000 refurbishing this 88,000 square foot
property, and have successfully leased it, mostly as a research and
development center. About 160 people work there.54
VI. PROPERTY TAXES FROM THE FORT TRUMBULL AREA THEN AND NOW
In 2000, the combined tax assessed value of property within the Fort
Trumbull planning area was $10,000,000. By 2009, the total would be

54

“One Chelsea Street—$24 million Corcoran Jennison office project at Fort Trumbull—88,000
sq. ft.; prime tenant is USCG Research and Development Center (160 employees)—opened in 2009.”
New London Dev. Corp., http://www.nldc.org/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
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55

almost $18,500,000. This does not count the millions in property taxes
that Pfizer and later owners will pay the city of New London on its
$300,000,000 facility.56
Property taxes matter a lot in Connecticut, covering about sixty-five
percent of local government expenditures.57 Each of Connecticut’s 169
towns and cities levies property taxes to cover its budget.58 Taxed assets
include all types of realty and certain items of personal property.59
Assessed values are supposed to be seventy percent of fair market value,
based on periodic re-appraisals.60
To raise enough taxes to cover their projected expenses, cities and
towns divide their budget by the total of assessed values on their Grand
List to come up with a tax rate in mills. A mill is one thousandth of a
dollar. To support budgeted expenditures of $50,000,000 from $2.5 billion
in assessed values, a city would have to levy a millage rate of 20. Taxed at
a millage rate of 20, a home valued at $500,000 would be subject to a tax
of $10,000.61
Towns rich in property values levy lower tax rates than poorer locales.
For instance, the millage rate in modest Waterbury is 40 while wealthy
New Canaan’s is less than 10.62 “Living in the inner cities, the poorest
places in the state, is much more expensive due to the very high taxes.”63
Understandably, financially strapped cities endeavor to build up their
property tax bases as best they can with new construction. As their
redevelopment projects succeed, underfinanced cities may be reluctant to
diminish their newly enhanced revenue stream by reducing their millage
rates. But as their tax base grows, these cities are less likely to increase
their tax rates, hoping eventually to bring their rates into line with
competing cities.

55
Students of Connecticut College, New London Development Corporation, Analysis of Real
Property Taxes: Fort Trumbull MDP Area (unpublished data, on file with author).
56
Id.
57
CONN. CONFERENCE OF MUNICIPALITIES, LOCAL PROPERTY TAXES AND CONNECTICUT’S
STATE GOVERNMENT (2006), available at www.ccm-ct.org/advocacy/propertytax/propertytaxbrochure.
pdf.
58
Conn. Office of Pol’y & Mgmt., Connecticut’s Property Tax Framework, http://www.ct.gov/
opm/cwp/view.asp?a=2985&q=383128 (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
59
Id.
60
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-62(b)(1), 12-62a(b) (2009); see also Conn. Office of Pol’y & Mgmt.,
supra note 58.
61
Conn. Office of Pol’y & Mgmt., supra note 58.
62
Posting of Roger to 1000 Friends of Connecticut Blog, http://1000friends-ct.blogspot.com/
2009/01/property-tax-i-basics.html (Jan. 27, 2009, 07:17 EST).
63
Id.
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VII. THE DEVELOPMENT IN FORT TRUMBULL’S FUTURE
As IJ reminds us, the contested parcels remain vacant in New London
and there are no immediate takers in sight.64 As memories fade of the
battle for the Little Pink House, so should the stigma that once attached to
Parcels 4A and 3. Those assembled parcels are sizable and well located
between the waterfront and the Amtrak line. They call to mind
Londregan’s explanation for older cities to be able to use eminent domain
for economic development. Eminent domain gave cities a chance to
compete with suburbia by assembling large tracts of land for
redevelopment from many previously subdivided little plots. “Without the
ability to assemble large tracts of land for economic development, New
London was doomed.”65 How else were cities to find the tax base to
support affordable housing, tax exempt schools, churches and government
offices, social programs, mental health clinics, and the homeless?66 No
city in New England except Boston had a bigger percentage of its potential
tax base—about fifty percent—exempt from the tax rolls, and Boston was
ten times bigger than New London.67 At least in this instance, NLDC
assembled and cleared a well located site that will be ready for
development when the real estate market rebounds.
Planning continues for the location of the U.S. Coast Guard Museum
in Fort Trumbull.68 John Brooks, Executive Director of NLDC, reports
that plans are also advancing for a hotel that would cater to regional
conventions and tourists.69 “If there had been no litigation, which took
64
IJ’s Scott Bullock made this argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, but Wes Horton, New
London’s appellate counsel, noted that “Justice Scalia gave Scott a particularly hard time on that: Why
do you want us to get involved in deciding whether it is going to work or not?” EMINENT DOMAIN USE
AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT 296 (Dwight H. Merriam & Mary Massaron Ross eds., 2006).
65
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 266; see also J. Peter Bryne, Condemnation of Low Income
Residential Communities Under the Takings Clause, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 131, 140 (2005).
66
See BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 50 (discussing NLDC’s plan to buy up property in order to
create space for new businesses such as a five-star hotel and a state-of-the-art conference center as part
of a grand plan for New London’s redevelopment).
67
See id. at 266.
68
John Ostermiller, Director of the National Coast Guard Museum to be built in Fort Trumbull,
addressed the Friends of Fort Trumbull on June 25, 2009. The Museum’s objective will be to educate
visitors about the extensive contributions the Coast Guard has made to provide security and to save
lives. Mr. Ostermiller is responsible for museum programming, internal infrastructure, and fundraising
efforts for the construction of the country’s newest national museum. Posting of Friends of Fort
Trumbull to The New London Day Event Calendar, http://thetimesgroup.com/events/eventpost.aspx?
PostID=21723 (May 11, 2009, 12:16 EST).
The Master Plan (completed by White Oak Associates) is at the Department of
Homeland Security, for submission to Congress this winter. Congress’ [sic] receipt
of this report allows the Coast Guard to budget for the operation of the museum
when completed ($3M+/year), and provide such assurance to USCG Museum
Association. Fund raising will be on hold until this is done.
E-mail from John Brooks, Executive Dir., New London Dev. Corp., to George Lefcoe (Oct. 13, 2009)
(on file with author).
69
Interview with John Brooks, Executive Dir., New London Dev. Corp. (June 1, 2009).
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years to work its way through (the court system), then a substantial portion
of this project would be constructed by now,” said Brooks. “But we are
victims of the economic cycle, and there is nothing we can do about
that.”70
Standing on the site where Kelo’s Little Pink House once stood, on a
bright blue day in June 2009, it is easy to imagine that happening, once the
economy recovers and hotel financing revives.
Meanwhile,
environmentalists will be cheered to know that the grasslands rising on
Fort Trumbull’s vacant sites offer a much needed habitat to species of
nesting birds and other wildlife that development has driven out of most
parts of New London.71
New London officials, residents, and well wishers were disappointed
to learn in November 2009, that Pfizer, having merged with Wyeth
Pharmaceuticals, was closing six of its eleven major research and
development sites worldwide, including the one in Fort Trumbull. Most of
the 1400 employees now working in New London will be transferred to the
company’s facility in Groton, Connecticut. The move will take place over
the next two years, as the company searches for a buyer or tenant for its
New London space.72 New London’s city manager observed at a council
meeting recently that “whatever business replaces Pfizer would be an
asset.”73 The space was developed entirely with offices, no lab space, and
this makes it easier to rent or sell. It could be of interest to biotech firms.74
City officials are hoping Pfizer will not sell out to a school, hospital, or
other tax exempt entity.75
The strategy of a redevelopment agency acquiring and clearing large
areas for development before committing a developer to the re-use of the
site is characteristic of projects funded from grants by higher levels of
government. As Professor William Fischel pointed out, cities have little
financial incentive to make a cost-benefit calculation that takes into
account the timing of future development, when they are not providing the

70
Katie Nelson, Conn. Land Taken from Homeowners Still Undeveloped, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Sept. 25, 2009.
71
Judy Benson, Fort Trumbull Neighborhood Is for the Birds, NEW LONDON DAY, July 7, 2009.
72
Adam Bowles, Pfizer To Close New London R&D Facility:1,400 Jobs Will Be Relocated to
Company’s Groton Campus, NORWICH BULL., Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.norwichbulletin.com/news/
business/x809126968/Pfizer-to-close-New-London-R-D-facility.
73
Kathleen Edgecomb, NL Council Wants To Be “Part of the Discussions” on Pfizer Site,
THEDAY.COM, Nov. 17, 2009, http://www.theday.com/article/20091117/NWS01/311179930/1070/
FRONTPAGE (referring to a statement by Martin H. Berliner, New London City Manager).
74
Paul Pescatello, President of CURE, the chief advocate for the pharmaceutical and biotech
industry in Connecticut, “envisions a joint venture of several biotech firms, perhaps some from Boston
or elsewhere in the Northeast and some from Connecticut, for example.” Eric Gershon, Pfizer’s New
London Complex May Be a Hard Sell, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 11, 2009, http://www.courant.com/
business/hc-pfizerbuilding.artnov11,0,378655.story.
75
Edgecomb, supra note 73. The site is not zoned for school or hospital use. Id.
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funds to buy the land. Local governments eagerly accept grants from
federal and state governments, not knowing for sure when those
governments will shut the cash flow spigot. Without state funds, NLDC
would not have had any means of financing the Fort Trumbull revival
effort. By way of contrast, redevelopment agencies relying mainly or
solely on locally raised revenues, usually tax increment financing,
generally refrain from acquiring and demolishing properties on the tax rolls
until a replacement user (and taxpayer) is firmly in hand.77
VIII. THE DEBATE ABOUT THE PROPER PLACE
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN LAND DEVELOPMENT
A topic Benedict never reaches, but one that lies just beneath the
surface in all of IJ’s endeavors, is whether local governments should
dictate the parameters of land development within their boundaries.
Libertarians tend to believe that local governments should confine their
involvement in land development to building roads, schools, and other
traditional “public uses,” reserve their redevelopment powers—if such
powers can be exercised at all—to the elimination of the most deeply
blighted properties that cannot be improved any other way, and restrict
zoning and other land use controls to reconciling potential
incompatibilities among adjoining private property owners.78 Libertarians
tend to share the late Jane Jacobs’s view that “planning a successful
downtown redevelopment, or housing and parks and a successful
neighborhood, wasn’t really possible at all—that cities and city
neighborhoods had an organic structure of their own that couldn’t be
produced at a drafting table.”79
76
William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants
Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 929, 943–44.
77
George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo: What’s Blight Got To Do with It?, 17 S.
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 803, 840–41 (2008).
Redevelopment agencies furiously assembled acreage “blind”—without any
commitments from developers to buy and build. Cities often discovered painfully,
after clearing out all the residents and small businesses that the market had already
been putting the land to its “highest and best use,” and there were no viable takers
for it. . . . Today, redevelopment is funded mainly by state grants and locally raised
tax revenues. By the time the federal cash cow ran dry, local governments came to
appreciate the virtues of redevelopment agencies striking a deal with a developer or
receiving sufficient expressions of interest and preliminary negotiations to attain
confidence that the project would be completed on schedule.
Id.; see also Marc B. Mihaly, Living in the Past: The Kelo Court and Public-Private Economic
Redevelopment, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 17 (2007).
78
See ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL, A COMPACT HISTORY 156–58 (2005); Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412, 1413 (2006); see
generally Steven Greenhut, New Urbanism: Same Old Social Engineering, FREEMAN, Apr. 2006,
available at http://www.heartland.org.custom/semod_policybot.pdf/20078.pdf (arguing that the land
use movement fits into a libertarian land use scheme because libertarians desire the elimination of all
land use regulations).
79
ANTHONY FLINT, WRESTLING WITH MOSES 124 (2009).
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The contrary view starts with the premise that an essential role of
effective government is to supply the framework within which urban
development takes place, a robust infrastructure of transportation networks,
schools, libraries, parks, bridges, and public buildings—even ardent
libertarians grudgingly concede the occasional utility of eminent domain to
acquire land for these purposes.80 Making the most efficient use of public
infrastructure investments and implementing broad environmental and land
use policies argues against leaving final decisions about the optimal use of
land solely to private developers. A city’s development, appearance, and
destiny should not rest entirely on the vagaries of fluctuating real estate
markets, transitory private developers and individual property owners more
focused on their short term interests than the city’s long term viability,
Governments need to rationalize the
sustainability, and appeal.81
connections between the location and density of land uses within a
community and the placement and quality of infrastructure.82 Lately,
public land use policies have favored smart growth, mixed land uses,
increased densities, and transit-oriented redevelopment.83
IX. IJ’S REPRESENTATION OF KELO AND OTHERS
IJ represented only seven of the ninety persons who had held title to
Fort Trumbull’s privately owned properties.84 Most of the other owners
negotiated a price based on two or more independent certified real estate
appraisals.85
In 1998, NLDC offered Kelo $78,000—a $22,000 profit.86 “Susette
balked. ‘Look at this view,’ she said, pointing toward the Thames River.
‘How many people with a $70,000 house have a view like this? If I leave

80

See Richard Epstein, Not So Private Takings: A Response to Abraham Bell’s Private Takings,
LEGAL WORKSHOP, Mar. 19, 2009, http://legalworkshop.org/2009/03/19/not-so-private-takings-aresponse-to-bell.
81
See Richard E. Foglesong, Planning the Capitalist City, in READINGS IN PLANNING THEORY
102, 103 (Scott Campbell & Susan S. Fainstein eds., 2d ed. 2003) (discussing the Marxist view of
urban planning).
82
See James Kushner, Growth for the Twenty-First Century—Tales from Bavaria and the Vienna
Woods: Comparative Images of Planning in Munich, Salzburg, Vienna, and the United States, 29 URB.
LAW. 911, 947–48 (1997) (offering a comparison of land use policies between Europe and the United
States).
83
INT’L ECON. DEV. COUNCIL, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SMART GROWTH 5 (Alex Iams &
Pearl Kaplan eds., 2006), available at http://www.iedonline.org/Downloads/Smart_Growth.pdf.
84
Of the six other owners, one had filed bankruptcy and had a limited financial stake in the
outcome, three were not residents of Fort Trumbull when NLDC initiated its acquisition effort, title to
one property was held by a construction company, and two separate landlords held title to a majority of
the properties at stake. Interview with John Brooks, supra note 69; see also Kelo II, 843 A.2d 500, 508
n.2 (2004); BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 201–03; Brooks & Busch, supra note 51, at 20–21.
85
“The vast majority of the properties were acquired in a friendly way.” Brooks, July 21 E-mail,
supra note 37.
86
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 67.
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here, where can I go and get the same thing?’”
At times, Kelo seems to have been motivated solely by the goal of
obtaining sufficient compensation to buy a similar house with a water
view. Bethe Dufresne, a writer for The New London Day, claims that she
sat at Susette Kelo’s kitchen table only days before IJ agreed to represent
the holdouts, while Kelo flipped through real estate ads. Dufresne reports
that Kelo seemed willing to consider “a small house in Niantic, with a
water view, for a little more than $200,000.” But Susette was distressed
because “NLDC claimed it couldn’t pay enough to replace what she felt
she’d be losing.”88
If Kelo’s goal was to squeeze NLDC for the highest possible price, IJ
would not have seen itself as the right lawyers for her. IJ’s stated goal is
not to obtain the most money for their clients from the condemnor, but to
resist the condemnation and enable their clients to reclaim title to their
homes and rental properties.
X. HOW IJ’S APPROACH DIFFERS FROM THAT OF MOST
EMINENT DOMAIN LAWYERS
In most cities, including New London, attorneys who specialize
exclusively in eminent domain stand ready to represent property owners
about to be shortchanged by a government’s last best offer. These
attorneys work on contingent fees, customarily pocketing between twenty
and fifty percent of the difference between the agency’s highest offer and
the sum eventually paid, including statutory relocation benefits.89 Of
course, eminent domain attorneys working on contingent fees will not take
a case unless, based on their own appraisers’ estimates, they believe the
owner’s just claim exceeds the agency’s best offer by a large enough sum
to make the case worthwhile for them.
The condemnation bar serves well the many realty and business
owners who have no problem with their properties being acquired by
eminent domain as long as the price is right. Governments are all cash
buyers; their purchases are not contingent on mortgage financing.90 Also,
sellers whose property is taken in eminent domain, real or threatened, can
reinvest the sales proceeds in similar property free of federal capital gains
87

Id. at 131.
Bethe Dufresne, Standoff at Fort Still Leaves Foes Room To Wiggle, NEW LONDON DAY, May
17, 2002.
89
See PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, 8A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 15.06[3]
(3d ed. 2009); see also Boston & Maine Corp. v. Sheehan, Phinney, Bass & Green, P.A., 778 F.2d 890,
892 (1st Cir. 1985); Gideon Kanner, Recent Developments in Eminent Domain, ALI-ABA Course of
Study, Jan. 4, 2001, WL SF54 ALI-ABA 1, at *22 (Westlaw) (2001).
90
Government entities must deposit with the court the estimated value of property it purports to
take through eminent domain. See 3 FERDINAND S. TINIO, NICHOLS CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL
PROCEDURE FORMS § 109.11 (2004).
88
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tax.
Homeowners, too, sometimes welcome governments as buyers.
Some were going to move sooner or later in any event (approximately
twelve percent of the population moved between 2006 and 2007;92 U.S.
homeowners’ median stay in the same residence is 8.2 years93).
Though Benedict writes that the Fort Trumbull property owners had
difficulty finding counsel to represent them,94 he does not mention the
cases of the three Fort Trumbull owners who sued NLDC for more money.
Two of them struck out; the court found that NLDC had proffered adequate
compensation. The third challenger won an increased award based on a
legitimate element of value NLDC’s appraisers had overlooked.95
Property owners seldom have difficulty finding condemnation counsel
to contest “low ball” offers. But eminent domain counsel duck and cover
when approached by property owners bearing offers that match or beat
prevailing norms for “just compensation.” IJ’s agenda, however, is not
about securing “just compensation” for their clients. IJ lawyers work
tirelessly to keep their clients in their homes and small businesses. Unless
they drop their cases mid-stream, IJ clients pay no legal fees. For IJ
attorney Scott Bullock, the “‘come to Jesus’ moment” arrives when the
condemner starts waving more money in front of his clients.96 He demands
“an ironclad promise” they will not capitulate.97
Benedict reports how IJ founder and president, Chip Mellor,
envisioned the organization’s mission:
The concept behind the Institute for Justice was the notion of
entrepreneurial lawyering at no charge to the clients. There
were no contingency-fee cases either. All of the institute’s
funding came from private donors. To Mellor, litigation was
always about much more than winning a single case. In his
world, cases had to be platforms for a cause that went beyond
any one individual.98
“‘We don’t negotiate property sales for our clients,’ Bullock explained.
‘That’s just not what we do. We fight to protect people’s property.’”99 To
advance the cause by assisting property owners to resist eminent domain
abuse and raise funds from the general public for the effort, IJ formed the
91

See 26 U.S.C. § 1033 (2006).
Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 1093, 1124 (2009) (citation omitted).
93
Id. at 1125.
94
See BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 153 (explaining that many lawyers and law firms in New
London did not want to sue the city on behalf of the Coalition to Save Fort Trumbull Neighborhood).
95
Brooks, July 21 E-mail, supra note 37.
96
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 169.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 199.
99
Id. at 169.
92
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“Castle Coalition” in 2002, a “nationwide grassroots property rights
activism project.”100
In situations where condemners forfeit the right to use eminent domain
due to their disregard of proper procedures, such as acting beyond their
statutory authority or taking property unconstitutionally, the contingency
fee lawyer sees these as opportunities for clients to negotiate much higher
settlement prices than the customary rules of “just compensation” would
normally allow. After all, such clients are freed from having to sell at all.
But owners not looking to sell regardless of price, owners who are
determined to retain title by overthrowing condemnations predicated on
faulty legal underpinnings, must be prepared to shoulder personally the
potentially enervating legal costs of suing a public entity. They only save
themselves from liability for big legal bills if a public interest firm like IJ
comes to their rescue.101
Under Connecticut law, these holdouts might have been summarily
evicted once NLDC started the process by filing with the clerk of the
Connecticut Superior Court a statement of compensation advising the
owners what NLDC believed their properties to be worth, and depositing
that sum with the court.102 Shortly thereafter, by operation of law, legal
title shifts to the condemner unless the property owner goes to court to halt
and unravel the process. That is what IJ lawyers Scott Bullock and Dana
Berliner had to do. They managed adroitly to keep their clients in place
during the ensuing five years of litigation.
XI. THE DECISION TO APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT DECISION
Kelo had a chance to keep her house following the state trial court’s
decision. The trial judge had ruled for the City of New London on all of
the constitutional issues but found that NLDC’s vague and contradictory
plans for Parcel 4A cast doubt on whether these properties were reasonably
necessary for NLDC to acquire. “[T]he city had failed to specify what it
100
Castle Coalition: Citizens Fighting Eminent Domain Abuse, http://www.castlecoalition.org/
(follow “About the Castle Coalition” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 31, 2010); see also Steven Anderson,
How the Castle Coalition Helped Save Chicago Businesses from Eminent Domain Abuse, LIBERTY &
L., Feb. 2008, at 4, available at http://www.instituteforjustice.org/images/pdf_folder/liberty/LL_208.pdf.
101
Noreen E. Johnson, Blight and Its Discontents: Awarding Attorney’s Fees to Property Owners
in Redevelopment Actions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 741, 742–43 (2008); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 887–88 (2007) (discussing the
high cost of hiring a fee-based attorney to fight low appraisals).
102
See 3 Conn. Prac. Civil Practice Forms, Form 404.1 authors’ cmt. (4th ed. 2004) (describing
the procedural requirements of the statement of compensation). Unless the property owner files suit
challenging the taking or the preferred compensation, the condemner has the right to immediate
possession. See Redevelopment Agency of Norwalk v. Norwalk Aluminum Foundry Corp., 233 A.2d
1, 5 (Conn. 1967) (stating that the condemner has the right to deduct from the price paid the value of
occupancy from the date the condemner first had the right to immediate possession, following its
service of a notice to quit upon the condemnee).
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planned to do with all the land beneath Susette’s house and all the other
houses on her block.”103 The city’s plans for Parcel 3 were clear enough.104
But NLDC had designated Parcel 4A for different uses at different points
in time—state park support, marina support, parking,105 and the U.S. Coast
Guard Museum—though a Coast Guard admiral had written a letter to
Kelo stating that the Coast Guard had no interest in placing its museum on
that particular parcel.106
The trial court based its decision on lack of reasonable necessity,107 a
challengeable result since most courts leave decisions concerning public
necessity for a taking to legislators—which properties to acquire, for what
purposes, whether the property taken is actually needed for the project, and
whether the project is likely to succeed.108
Still, if no one appealed the decision, Susette Kelo, Billy Von Winkle,
and Matthew Dery could have retained title to their properties. This could
have been deeply disappointing to Billy Von Winkle, a real estate
entrepreneur who was eager to cash out—at the right price.109 Appealing
the decision would also benefit IJ’s cause by keeping the case in the news.
Matthew Dery’s situation was more complicated. His parents owned four
units, one occupied by Matt’s family, another by his parents, and three
rental units—a duplex and a single family rental.110 Matt’s mother,
Wilhelmina, resided in the very same house in which she had been born,
and where she would pass away at age eighty-eight in 2006.111 By not
appealing, he could be assured of his parents’ undisturbed possession for
life. But renting might become a challenge once NLDC cleared Parcel 4A
of all other structures except those owned by the three holdouts. For Kelo,
this would be her last chance to hang on to the Little Pink House, and she
let it go.
103

BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 268.
See id. at 265 (stating that Parcel 3 was to be used as office space and parking).
105
The court in Kelo I noted:
At one point it says: “A portion of parcel 4A will be redeveloped for uses that
support the state park such as parking or for uses such as retail that will serve park
visitors and members of the community.” At another point it says: “Parcel 4A is
intended to accommodate the development of support facilities for a marina, or a
marina training facility, to be developed south on parcel 4B and the Fort Trumbull
State Park to the east.”
Kelo I, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *224 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002).
106
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 187.
107
Kelo I, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *265.
108
Id. at *246–48.
109
E-mail from John Brooks, Executive Dir., New London Dev. Corp., to George Lefcoe (June
10, 2009, 15:53 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brooks, June 10 E-mail].
110
E-mail from John Brooks, Executive Dir., New London Dev. Corp., to George Lefcoe (Aug. 6,
2009, 12:17 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brooks, Aug. 6 E-mail].
111
Elaine Stoll, Wilhelmina Dery, Who Fought Eminent Domain, Dies in Her Fort Trumbull
Home, NEW LONDON DAY, Mar. 14, 2006, available at http://emdo.blogspot.com/2006/04/wilhelminadery-who-fought-eminent.html.
104
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After the trial court judgment was handed down, the NLDC executive
committee, acting on behalf of the board, voted to
refrain from instituting appeal proceedings in the IJ case and
accept the judgment as rendered in the Superior Court, with
the caveat that the NLDC will defend its position in appeals
initiated by other parties and reserve for future consideration
the right to file appropriate cross appeals in such event.
Further, that the NLDC calls on all other parties to also
accept the decision without appeal.112
John Brooks observes that the NLDC Board was prepared to abandon the
use of eminent domain and work around the six parcels and nine buildings
on Parcel 4A that the plaintiffs owned.113 In the end, the Parcel 4A
plaintiffs took their chances and agreed to join the appeal, along with the
Parcel 3 plaintiffs, out of a feeling of solidarity, and greatly influenced by
Bullock’s conviction that NLDC would try to find some way to condemn
the properties later.114
The plaintiffs’ mistrust of NLDC was heightened by a statement that
its then-Executive Director, Dave Goebel, made to a local newspaper
columnist that, if the corporation could not acquire Parcel 4A voluntarily,
it might use eminent domain in the future.115 Bullock feared that even if
NLDC did not change its mind and decided to appeal, it might come back
with “another developer” to condemn the properties on that parcel.116 He
used this rationale to advise the plaintiffs to reject NLDC’s proposal.117
But NLDC would have needed city permission to make this switch and to
do it by December 31, 2002, unless the City of New London extended that
deadline.118
112
E-mail from John Brooks, Executive Dir., New London Dev. Corp., to George Lefcoe (June 3,
2009, 08:12 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brooks, June 3 E-mail].
113
See Brooks, June 10 E-mail, supra note 109 (“The Coast Guard began to waver on the
acceptance of a site possibly made toxic by eminent domain, and it is highly unlikely that they would
have concurred with a ‘second bite at the apple’ prior to the end of the year to secure Parcel 4A with
eminent domain. At least one letter mentioned that they hoped that a site would be assembled ‘without
the use of eminent domain.’”).
114
See BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 272.
115
Id.
116
Brooks, June 3 E-mail, supra note 112.
117
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 272.
118
According to Brooks:
The fact of the matter was that eminent domain expired on December [3]1[,] 2002.
Unless there was a development agreement signed with the Coast Guard Museum
Association prior to that date, there would have been no development meeting Judge
Corradino’s test. There was no chance of the CGMA being in a position to sign by
then, since they needed to raise money to develop much of the information required.
No other option was even close, since that was still [the] intended site for [the]
USCG Museum. Once IJ appealed, the 4A litigants (“winners”) refused to consider
voluntary sale to a third party (for the purpose of assemblage for [the] USCG
Museum), and the wheels were in motion leading to [the] U.S. Supreme Court.
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Measured from the trial court decision on March 13, 2002, NLDC
would have had nine months left before its right to use the power of
eminent domain expired.120 During this time, NLDC would have had to
identify a convincing use for taking Parcel 4A, and yet it had no potential
developer in sight for the parcel. However unlikely it was that NLDC
could push through the amendment process in nine months, the text of the
enabling statute left one loophole. The City Council could extend the
condemnation deadline if it were prepared to incur the bad press this would
entail.121
XII. THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY
In appealing the trial court decision, Bullock and Berliner knew they
were taking a big chance because the trial court had framed the ruling in
their favor on Parcel 4A on two highly questionable legal assumptions.
One was the burden of proof. Under Connecticut law, the property owner
has the burden of proving that the taking was in error.122 The trial court
had clearly reversed that presumption and placed the burden on NLDC.
Further, courts rarely second-guess legislative determinations that a
particular property is necessary for a public purpose.123 Berliner had
reminded Bullock of this when he decided to include a count in his
complaint based on the fact that NLDC did not need the properties on
Parcel 4A to fulfill its municipal development plan. He had added this
count because, “[u]nlike most of the other parcels within the ninety-acre
development area, Parcel 4A had not been designated for any specific
construction.”124 Predictably, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the
trial court’s decision regarding Parcel 4A, rejecting the trial court’s opinion
on both of these points.125
Eventually, IJ won a partial trial court victory for some of its clients.
Had no one appealed the judgment, Kelo and some of the other plaintiffs
could have reclaimed title and stayed put. Instead, IJ appealed and lost,
4-3 in the Connecticut Supreme Court and 5-4 in the United States
Brooks, June 3 E-mail, supra note 112.
119
Kelo I, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002).
120
See Brooks, June 3 E-mail, supra note 112 (noting that “eminent domain expired on December
[3]1, 2002”).
121
See Brooks, June 10 E-mail, supra note 109.
122
Kelo II, 843 A.2d 500, 572 (Conn. 2004).
123
See Kelo I, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *197–98 (“Our decisions establish
that a court will not disturb a determination of necessity, [in] the absence of fraud, bad faith or gross
abuse of discretion; the determination of the necessity of taking will be upheld if there is reasonable
ground to support it.”).
124
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 207.
125
Kelo II, 843 A.2d at 569, 572–73; see also Robert C. Bird & Lynda J. Oswald, Necessity as a
Check on State Eminent Domain Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2010) (making a spirited
case for courts to grant limited review of whether particular takings are necessary).
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Supreme Court.
XIII. THE DISPUTE AMONG NEW LONDON’S ATTORNEYS OVER HOW
BEST TO FRAME THEIR CASE BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
For Londregan, the trial court’s opinion was particularly distressing.
He believed that a project met the constitutional standard of “public use” as
Meticulously,
long as it conferred substantial public benefits.126
Londregan had established at trial the sizable “public goods” that NLDC’s
plan had conferred.127 At trial, Londregan had carefully proven, lot by lot,
that each of the buildings on Parcel 4A stood in the way of widening the
street to the nationally acceptable standard right-of-way of fifty feet128 and
making sure all buildings were sufficiently set back from the corners of
their lots to provide a safe line-of-sight for passing vehicles.129 Surely
roads and sidewalks counted as quintessential public uses. Even IJ
conceded as much in its public relations statements concerning eminent
domain.130
The attorneys who advised New London on condemnation matters,
Wes Horton and Ed O’Connell, questioned Londregan’s analysis.131 Sure,
NLDC’s city-approved plan for Fort Trumbull had substantial public
benefits and public uses. But the condemnations of Parcel 4A were not
initiated under provisions of the Connecticut statutes dealing with
highways, parks, or other widely acknowledged public uses.132 Instead,
eminent domain was initiated under Chapter 132 concerning economic
126
See BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 249 (“[L]ondregan still felt he would prevail. The fact that the
city’s municipal-development plan included new utilities, roads, and infrastructure to the Fort Trumbull
area—all public benefits—seemed to bode well for the city.”).
127
See id. at 254 (“[At trial], Londregan pointed out that the NLDC had spent $73 million in state
money to upgrade the roads, sewers, streetlights, and underground utilities in and around the Fort
Trumbull area—all of which resulted in public benefits.”).
128
See DAVID E. JOHNSON, RESIDENTIAL LAND DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES 90 (3d ed. 2008)
(“Most municipalities use a 50-foot right-of-way for local residential streets. The right-of-way changes
as the number of lots or average daily traffic (ADT) changes for a road segment.”). The “right of way”
is not just the roadway, but “includes curbs, grass ‘snow shelf,’ sidewalks, street lighting [sic] etc.”
Brooks, Aug. 6 E-mail, supra note 110. The standard is twenty-eight feet for a street with no parking
“(curb to curb),” and “34 [feet] if marked for parking on one side of the street.” Id.
129
See JOHNSON, supra note 128, at 90. “The real issue for 4A was that they were located on key
corners (and sightlines at corners are a real safety issue).” E-mail from John Brooks, Executive Dir.,
New London Dev. Corp., to George Lefcoe (Apr. 21, 2009) (on file with author).
130
See Dana Berliner, Attorney, Inst. for Justice, Unequal Protection—The Injustice of Using
Eminent Domain on Behalf of Private Business, Address at the Fourth Annual New York Conference
on Private Property Rights (1999), available at http://prfamerica.org/speeches/4th/UnequalProtection.
html (observing that the government can use eminent domain if it plans on owning the property it is
taking, such as a road).
131
Interview with Edward B. O’Connell, Attorney, in New London, Conn. (June 1, 2009).
132
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 13a-73(b) (2009) (authorizing the taking of land for state
highway modification purposes or for the creation of a highway maintenance storage area); Id. § 48-7
(permitting the taking of land within municipal or district limits for a public park or common area in
the event that the owner of the desired tract does not consent to the taking).
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development. Roads were being widened, not necessarily or exclusively
for park or marina purposes, but rather to support future economic
development on Parcels 3 and 4A. Hence, NLDC needed the courts to
vindicate the state statute authorizing condemnation to advance economic
development.
If the attorneys for NLDC contended that an economic development
project qualified as a “public use” when private benefits were incidental to
benefits accruing to the general public, this could arouse the Justices to
interrogate counsel on where to “draw a boundary on how far a city could
go to take people’s homes or businesses in the name of economic
New London’s appellate counsel, Wes Horton,
development.”134
dismissed this approach because it would invite questions from the Justices
that could easily gobble up the few minutes the Supreme Court allows
counsel for oral argument.135 Better to take the controversial tack that, in
the realm of economic development, any public good counted as a public
use, including increasing the property-tax base, regardless of whether the
project also benefited private individuals and firms. In oral argument, New
London’s counsel would concede—to Justice O’Connor’s evident dismay,
and Bullock’s great delight—that a city could replace a Motel 6 with a Ritz
Carlton just for the increased property taxes.136 New London’s counsel lost
Justice O’Connor’s vote on that one, but carried the day nonetheless.137
XIV. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT MAJORITY OPINION
Benedict barely mentions the sweeping rationale of the majority
opinion. The majority firmly rejected IJ’s attempt to differentiate
economic development takings from the Supreme Court’s approval half a
century earlier in Berman v. Parker of the use of eminent domain to
eradicate blight through urban redevelopment.138 Had the Court ruled
otherwise, there would have been no one to blame for the outcome but exGovernor Rowland, who started the events in motion by deciding to
proceed under Connecticut’s economic development laws instead of its
urban redevelopment statutes. Whether the City of New London could
have established the requisite findings under Connecticut’s redevelopment
133

Kelo I, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *287 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002).
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 312.
EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT, supra note 64, at 307–08.
136
Id. at 302, 308.
137
See id. at 291, 308 (stating Bullock’s observation that the Supreme Court in Kelo upheld New
London’s use of eminent domain for private economic development, but that Horton’s response to the
Motel 6 question contributed to Justice O’Connor’s dissent). Wes Horton himself is not sure whether
the Court’s opinion in Kelo would support the government taking one owner’s property to transfer to
another private owner just for increased property-tax revenues. Id. at 297.
138
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954); see generally Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the
Story of Berman v. Parker (Nov. 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1511343.
134
135
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laws, we will never know for sure. But the majority opinion declines to
endow the distinction with constitutional significance:
Those who govern the City were not confronted with the
need to remove blight in the Fort Trumbull area, but their
determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to
justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our
deference. The City has carefully formulated an economic
development plan that it believes will provide appreciable
benefits to the community, including—but by no means
limited to—new jobs and increased tax revenue. As with
other exercises in urban planning and development, the City
is endeavoring to coordinate a variety of commercial,
residential, and recreational uses of land, with the hope that
they will form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. To
effectuate this plan, the City has invoked a state statute that
specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote
economic development.139
XV. LITIGATING IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION
Though the IJ lawyers were rebuffed in the Connecticut and U.S.
Supreme Courts, they decisively crushed NLDC in the court of public
opinion. Public disapproval of the Kelo ruling ran eighty to ninety
percent.140 Media relations are very important to IJ: its business model
depends on public awareness of its accomplishments to draw donors to
support its mission.
One of the first people the IJ founders hired was a full time public
relations expert, John E. Kramer.141 Kramer knows how IJ works, has
spent years nurturing his list of media contacts, and possesses an
impressive talent for telling the IJ story in a crisp and convincing way.142
IJ lawyers routinely and enthusiastically contribute to the public
relations effort. So, for instance, immediately upon agreeing to represent
Kelo and her neighbors, Bullock and Berliner formulated the following
game plan: (1) “Draft the legal complaint”; (2) “Develop a background
paper on the case, discussing the case history and the plaintiffs’
background”; (3) “Generate a media advisory”; (4) “Produce a news
139

Kelo III, 545 U.S. 469, 483–84 (2005).
Janice Nadler et al., Government Takings of Private Property: Kelo and the Perfect Storm 16
(Northwestern Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, Working Paper No. 07-05, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=962170.
141
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 209–10.
142
See, e.g., John E. Kramer, Sending in the IJ Cavalry, LIBERTY & L., Sept. 2001, available at
http://www.ij.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1737&Itemid=245 (demonstrating
Kramer’s skill in story-telling in an article by Kramer about the Kelo case).
140
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release for distribution on the day the lawsuit would be filed”; and (5)
“Plan an event in New London to accompany the filing.”143
IJ won the media contest by default. Tom Londregan, New London’s
long time city attorney (who had never heard of IJ before this case arose)
resolved to fight the case only in court, not on the courthouse steps. “‘I’m
not used to competing in the media,’ Londregan said later. ‘I’m just used
to going to court and arguing a case. We are such novices in the mediarelations business that we never got our story out to the public.”144
Londregan concedes this was a big mistake. Too late, he learned that a
victory in court can prove worthless when offset by a decisive defeat in the
court of public opinion.145 The public outcry led to changes in eminent
domain laws across the country.146 For the litigants, the consequences
were up close and personal. After the City finally prevailed in court and
established its right to take the IJ plaintiffs’ properties by eminent domain,
the Mayor and City Council were poised to press their victory and take
possession of the holdouts’ properties, forcibly if necessary. But the
Governor of Connecticut intervened to avoid a media free-for-all eviction
show down. In a series of vigorously negotiated settlements, the Governor
agreed to pay the holdouts far more money than most other Fort Trumbull
property owners had received, on the understanding they would move out
peaceably.147 Earlier, the U.S. Coast Guard walked away from Parcel 4A
(the site of the Kelo house) as the location for a U.S. Coast Guard Museum
to escape any political fall-out from the nationwide eminent domain
protests.148 The well-publicized eminent domain controversy may have
stigmatized Parcel 4A for other potential developers as well.149
This experience has turned Londregan around on the topic of litigation
public relations. Had he to do it again, he says the first person he would
add to his firm’s roster would be “not another appellate lawyer, not a

BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 205–06.
Id. at 271.
145
HAGGERTY, supra note 31, at xviii.
146
See Douglas W. Kmiec, Hitting Home—The Supreme Court Earns Public Notice Opining on
Public Use, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 501, 501 (2007); George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic
TIF-Driven Economic Development: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners
and School Districts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 45, 48 (2008); Alberto B. Lopez, Revisiting Kelo and Eminent
Domain’s “Summer of Scrutiny,” 59 ALA. L. REV. 561, 564 (2008); Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo’s Legacy:
Eminent Domain and the Future of Property Rights, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 104–05 (2005); John G.
Sprankling, Introduction: The Impact of Kelo v. New London on Eminent Domain, 38 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 369, 370 (2007); William Woodyard & Glenn Boggs, Public Outcry: Kelo v. New London—A
Proposed Solution, 39 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 (2009); Kristyna C. Ryan, Private Property, Public Benefit:
Economic Redevelopment and the Power of Eminent Domain, 19 CBA REC. 50, 50 (2005).
147
See infra note 165 and accompanying text (listing the properties involved, the NLDC
appraised value in 2000, and the price paid in 2006, adjusted for inflation).
148
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 187, 207.
149
See Brooks & Busch, supra note 51, at 23 (noting the effect negative media may have had on
the City of New London).
143
144

952

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:925
150

paralegal, not an associate, but a media relations specialist.”
Finding a qualified specialist in litigation public relations is seldom
easy. Good sales people need to understand what they are selling and few
PR specialists know much about law or legal proceedings. The revenue
tends to ebb and flow, and therefore can be difficult to predict for
budgeting purposes at a large PR firm. “[T]he senior-level nature of the
work, with its complexity, doesn’t fit well with most PR firms, where the
senior executives sell the business and junior people actually do the
work.”151
XVI. DEFINING “JUST COMPENSATION”:
WHY COURTS TEND TO REJECT REPLACEMENT VALUE AS THE NORM
Quite often, a home is worth more to its owner than the price the home
would bring in an arm’s length sale. That may have been true of Kelo and
her Little Pink House.152 This premium is sometimes called “consumer
surplus.”153 Consumer surplus is one of the many types of losses courts
have excluded from the constitutional requirement that governments pay
“just compensation” for takings.154 The Fifth Amendment’s cryptic
requirement of “just compensation” prescribes no standard for how to
measure value. Courts have equated “just compensation” to the price a
willing seller would pay a willing buyer neither under duress to sell nor to
buy, and must often choose between the parties’ rival appraisals.155 “Fair
market value” is not the only conceivable standard of “just compensation.”
150
Interview with Tom Londregan, New London City Attorney, in New London, Conn. (June 1,
2009) (on file with author).
151
E-mail from Jim Haggerty, CEO, PR Consulting Group, to George Lefcoe (July 23, 2009,
15:05 EST) (on file with author).
152
See BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 89 (“Her house represented her only possession. More than
that, it was a refuge, the place she went to in hope of becoming the woman she had always put off
being while raising five sons. She had remodeled the house to reflect her personality and tastes.”).
153
“Consumer surplus is a measure of the welfare that people gain from the consumption of goods
and services, or a measure of the benefits they derive from the exchange of goods.” Geoff Riley, AS
Markets and Market Systems, Consumer Surplus, http://tutor2u.net/economics/revision-notes/asmarkets-consumer-surplus.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
154
See The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15–16 (2005) (statement of Thomas W. Merrill,
Professor, Columbia University School of Law) (noting that the current compensation required by the
courts is inadequate because it is not full compensation); Bell & Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation
Private, supra note 101, at 885–87; Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property
Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 926–28 (2004); John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of
Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 803–06 (2006); Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain
Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 960–62 (2004); Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo and the Local Political
Process, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 14–16 (2005); Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent
Domain’s Political Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 298–99 (2006); Katrina
Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 239, 252–54 (2007);
Nathan Burdsal, Note, Just Compensation and the Seller’s Paradox, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 79, 94–95
(2005); Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Squaring the Eminent Domain Circle: A New Approach to
Land Assembly Problems, LAND LINES, Jan. 2007, at 14, 18–19.
155
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934).
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The U.S. Supreme Court identified a competing norm calling for
restoration: “The owner is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he
would have occupied if his property had not been taken.”156 A “restoration
measure” recognizes that there are certain economic costs imposed on
condemnees excluded from “fair market value.”157 In practice, the norm of
restoration has generally been subordinated to the market value standard.
Courts are sensitive to issues of horizontal equity—the need to treat all
property owners alike. For this reason, “just compensation” is not
designed to put owners in as good a position as they would have enjoyed
had the condemnation not taken place. A standard calling for replacement
or restoration almost assuredly would produce differential treatment among
owners whose properties were physically comparable, or even identical.
One owner may have had the idea of selling anyway and welcomes the
government as an all cash buyer. A second owner, a book collector with
4000 volumes at home, not planning to move anytime soon, might
nonetheless be willing if someone paid her library moving costs. A third
owner may be so infirm that the move could kill her. She flatly refuses to
sell at any price. One price does not really fit all, even if a real estate
appraiser concluded that each of the three homes had the same value.158
“Increasingly, legislatures are adjusting their models of compensation to
take account of the condemnee’s actual losses. Federal and state
governments have authorized compensation for attorneys fees, appraisal
costs, moving and relocation, and lost business good will.”159
XVII. THE FINAL SETTLEMENT WITH THE HOLDOUTS
In the end, after the U.S. Supreme Court decision, the New London
Mayor and City Council wanted to evict the holdouts and pay them on the
same basis as other Fort Trumbull owners (the mayor received over 4000
e-mail death threats related to the Kelo episode).160 But the State held the
compensation purse strings. Benedict reports that Governor Rell did not
agree with the Supreme Court majority, and worried how it would look,
especially to her staunch Republican base, to be seen as the one
responsible for the sheriff forcibly evicting Kelo and the other holdouts.161
Bullock skillfully represented the holdouts in a daring “high-stakes

156
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943); see also United States v. Lee, 360 F.2d 449,
452 (5th Cir. 1966).
157
Miller, 317 U.S. at 373–75.
158
GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 880, 883 (6th
ed. 2009).
159
Id. at 883–85.
160
Kathleen Edgecomb, NL Officials Regret Relinquishing Power of Eminent Domain, NEW
LONDON DAY, Mar. 5, 2009.
161
BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 331, 363.
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game of chicken.”
He benefited from the Governor’s fear that Kelo and
the others would defy a court order to vacate, and be seen on national
television being dragged from their dwellings by law enforcement officials.
But Bullock also knew that if he continued haggling to the point of
exhausting the Governor’s patience, she might just step aside and let New
London officials put a harsh end to the caper.163 Under Connecticut law,
the property had belonged to the State since 2000, and the owners could be
held accountable for enormous back taxes, utilities, occupancy fees, and
any rental income they had collected.164 In the end, the holdouts were
relieved on these obligations and received about twice the year 2000
appraised values, plus relocation benefits.165
Half the money went to two landlords in the group—Rich Beyer and
Billy Von Winkle.166 In 1998, Von Winkle would have taken $700,000.167
In 2006, he settled for $1,800,000.168
XVIII. KELO’S SETTLEMENT AFTERMATH
Kelo was the last to settle. Benedict reports the reason for her finally
agreeing to exit Fort Trumbull: “And for the first time, she got a sense of
what it would feel like if she prevailed and got to stay in the fort—awfully
lonely. . . . The thought of staying behind in an abandoned neighborhood
without her friends felt terribly depressing.”169 Of course, the area had
been fairly desolate for the past four years, ever since NLDC demolished
the structures on the sites it had acquired earlier.170
Kelo agreed in June 2006 to sell for $442,000 ($392,000 plus a pay-off
of her $50,000 mortgage); not too bad for a place she had purchased in
162

Id. at 361.
Id. at 360–61.
Id. at 359.
165
Below is the list of the NLDC appraised values for each of the plaintiffs’ properties. It is
followed by a list of these sums adjusted for inflation, and, finally, the sums negotiated in 2006. In
addition to the following sums, each plaintiff received between $15,000 and $30,000 in relocation
benefits. This information comes directly from NLDC files. In 2000, the plaintiffs’ properties were
appraised as follows: Kelo, $123,000; the Derys, $506,000; Von Winkle, $768,000; Beyer, $216,000;
the Cristofaros, $150,000; Brelesky (Athenian), $88,000; and the Gureskys, $158,000. Using an
inflation calculator, the plaintiffs’ appraisals, adjusted for inflation to 2006, were as follows: Kelo,
$144,000; the Derys, $592,390.24; Von Winkle, $899,121.95; Beyer, $368,780.49; the Cristofaros,
$175,609.76; Brelesky (Athenian), $67,902.44; and the Gureskys, $184,975.61. In 2006, the plaintiffs
settled for the following amounts: Kelo, $392,000; the Derys, $950,000; Von Winkle, $1,800,000;
Beyer, $500,000; the Cristofaros, $460,000; Brelesky (Athenian), $174,652; and the Gureskys,
$320,884. Brooks, July 21 E-mail, supra note 37.
166
See BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 369 (stating that Beyer agreed to settle for $500,000 plus
costs).
167
Id. at 62.
168
Id. at 369. As far as I have been able to determine, none of the IJ media releases mention this,
though Benedict does, and clearly.
169
Id. at 363.
170
Id. at 238.
163
164
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August 1997 for $53,500, and NLDC had appraised for condemnation at
$123,000 in November 2000.172 She only sold the lot. Avner Gregory, the
same preservationist who had refurbished the house after moving it from
its original location to the site where Kelo found it, relocated the house a
second time to a vacant parcel with a pre-existing foundation, in a modest
neighborhood several miles away, on the other side of the Amtrak rail line
from Fort Trumbull. A plaque identifies the house as “The Kelo
House.”173
For $224,000, Kelo bought a home with a view comparable to the one
she had surrendered, located right across the sound from her Little Pink
House, near Fort Griswold in Groton.174 “[S]he knew it was what she
wanted: a little house on a little hill overlooking the water.”175 She put
aside the balance of the money for her five sons.176 One can imagine this
as a happy ending to Benedict’s story: the actress playing Kelo casts a
knowing smile, content in her new home (median household income, per
capita income, and house or condo values are higher in Groton than New
London177).
Despite the windfall, Kelo seems not to be living happily ever after.
She proclaimed in the opening line of a speech at a January 27, 2009, event
sponsored by the libertarian CATO Institute: “My name is Susette Kelo,
and the government stole my home.”178 This statement may strike one as
odd. Thieves do not usually dole out to their victims a bundle of cash
exceeding the value of the items stolen.179 Presumably, Kelo meant to
draw attention to her continued belief that NLDC had no lawful right to
take her home in the first place.
In 2006, Kelo sent a demonic holiday greeting card depicting a snowy
171

Id. at 16, 374.
Id. at 191.
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image of the Little Pink House to about thirty public officials who had
opposed her: “Your houses, your homes, your family, your friends. May
they live in misery that never ends. I curse you all. May you rot in hell.
To each of you I send this spell.”180 Apparently, Kelo resisted the
temptation to send the card to the five U.S. Supreme Court Justices in the
majority.181 Was she serious? Was this meant as a harmless, mischievous
prank? Did losing her home cause her to become unhinged? Was she
wacky all along? Is she trying to reclaim the media spotlight now,
regretful that her fifteen minutes of fame is winding down? Kelo told a
reporter, “These people can think what they want of me. I will never, ever
forget what they did.”182
XIX. CONCLUSION: THE LAST WORD
Who would have imagined that a book about an eminent domain case
could be an irresistible read? Benedict is a great storyteller who takes us
behind the scenes in a series of pitched legal battles. He does not allow his
IJ-tilted spin to spoil the fun. Little Pink House is chock full of delicious
anecdotes, heated encounters, even a touching love story.
Whether a screenplay can be fashioned from these pages is a question
best left to my colleagues in film school. In Hollywood, the land where all
good dreams are supposed to come true, Kelo does not appear to be living
happily ever after. Maybe the final image needs to be of the Little Pink
House at its new location, 36 Franklin Street, a fitting reminder of a
historic controversy.183
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